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MIGRATORY POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: HOW TO BRING BEST 
PEOPLE BACK? 
Damien Besancenot1 and Radu Vranceanu2 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the decision of a migrant to return or stay within the framework of a signaling model with 
exogenous migratory costs. If employers have only imperfect information about the type of a worker and good 
workers migrate, bad workers might copy their strategy in order to get the same high wage as the good workers. 
Employers will therefore reduce the wage they pay to migrants and good workers incur a loss compared to the 
perfect information setup. In one hybrid equilibrium of the game, the more bad workers migrate, the higher the 
incentive for good workers to come back. Policy implications follow. 
 
Keywords: Temporary migration, Return migrants, Hybrid Bayesian Equilibrium, Signaling 
model. 
JEL Classification: J61, F22, D82 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Compared to the other dimensions of economic globalization -- international trade and 
movements of capital -- international flows of labour used to be traditionally small. The existence 
of a system of double barriers, with restrictions on people to leave poor countries and restrictions 
to reach the developed ones, can explain both why immigration flows were small and why most 
of the migrants were of the permanent type. However, in the last few years, subject to an aging 
population and shortages of labor in some sectors, many governments in the developed countries 
become more favorable to open their countries to foreign workers. True, political support to 
immigration of skilled workers is much stronger than for the non skilled. To the contrary, in the 
developing countries, many policymakers are upset about the "brain-drain" phenomenon, where 
skilled workers are attracted by the perspective of higher living standards in the developed 
countries, thus depleting what seems to be a very scarce resource in these areas. Migration of the 
unskilled workforce is seen as a less harmful phenomenon, especially if unemployment in the 
developing country is high. 
In 2005-2007, twelve relatively poor Eastern European countries joined the European Union. 
This created an exceptional opportunity for workers form the East to live and work in the West 
(Mansour and Quillin, 2006). According to the European Commission's latest report on cross-
border labor mobility (European Commission, 2008), more and more workers from the EU's 12 
newest member states have been relocating to the Western regions of Europe since being allowed 
to move freely. However, their numbers remain small as compared to the population of the host 
countries. For instance, the number of Bulgarians and Romanians who found a job in one of the 
EU's 15 older member states grew to 1.6 million in 2007, that is 0.4 percent of the total 
population of the EU's richest nations, up from 1.3 million in 2006 -- when those two countries 
were not yet part of the EU. Citizens from Poland and from the other nine countries that joined 
the EU in 2004 now account for 0.5 percent of the resident population of the EU's richest nations, 
up from 0.3 percent in 2004. 
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Another element to be taken into account when analyzing international movements of labor 
pertains to the distinction between temporary and permanent migration. At difference with 
permanent migrants, temporary migrants work abroad for a pre-determined time period, then 
return. It may be argued that workers hired under a fixed-term contract have no other choice but 
to return, so there is no genuine economic decision to analyze. However, in many cases, workers 
who go abroad on temporary contracts can stay longer should they really want it. 
In general, temporary migration is seen as bringing a net positive contribution to the 
development of the sending country. True, migration, even if it is temporary, diminishes the 
amount of available labor at home. If there are labor shortages, this first impact of temporary 
migration is negative; yet, if the unemployment in the developing country is high, temporary 
migration can alleviate the pressure on the welfare system. Other benefits stem from the 
improvement in human capital connected to short spells of work abroad and the investment in the 
origin country of the migrants' savings (Ruhs, 2005). It turns out that a non-negligible proportion 
of the new East-West European migrants are temporary. From the outset, they do not commit on 
staying forever in the host country. They consider the case for working for some time in the 
West, then to come back (Dustmann, 2000; Dustmann and Weiss, 2007).3 For example, data for 
the UK and Ireland suggest that around half of the EU-8 citizens who have come to work in the 
UK since 2004 may have already left the country again (European Commission, 2008). 
Several economists aimed at explaining the migrant's decision to return. In general, in these 
analyses, critical elements are the costs and benefits of migration. Benefits are most often 
interpreted as a better wage, given that in general migrants come from less developed regions 
(Hicks, 1932). Costs to migration measure some form of disutility connected to living far from 
one's friends and family. A standard model of return migration was worked out by Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996), building on the methodology introduced by Borjas (1987) in an early paper.4 
The basic framework is a self-selection model with stochastic income. From the outset, skill 
distribution of the migrants dominates the skill distribution of the stayers. Upon arriving in the 
rich country, the migrant makes a draw from a known distribution of wages; if the wage is low 
enough, he will return, if not he will stay. If he returns, he will make again a draw from a random 
distribution. The decision to migrate, then to return is driven by a comparison between the actual 
and expected gains. One important conclusion is that if both cost of migrating and the cost of 
returning increase, the frequency of return migrants declines.5 Stark (1995) works out a migration 
model with asymmetric information about the type of the migrants, where migrants' true skills are 
revealed with a lag. When low-skilled workers are no longer pooled with high-skilled workers, 
they return. Dustmann and Weiss (2007) analyze the worker's decision to migrate, stay or return 
within a continuous time model with investment in human capital; the worker decides on the 
optimal migration and return moments such as to maximize intertemporal utility, given that he 
must weight the cost of living among foreigners against the benefit of enhancing his skills by 
working in a more demanding environment. Indeed, migrants might take advantage of their stay 
abroad to foster their productivity by acquiring new skills, learning new production and 
organization methods, foreign languages, or join useful professional networks.6 
                                                 
3Temporary migration can also be observed between Latin and North America, and within the 
East-Asian region. 
4Itself an extenssion of the classical Roy model (Roy, 1951). 
5See also De Coulon and Piracha (2002) for an empirical test of a variant of this model with 
Albanian data. 
6Mesnard (2004) uses data from a Tunisia survey to show that the evidence about this process of 
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Some economists have unveiled from the data that return migrants tend to find a job easier, 
and that sometimes they get better wages than similar left-home workers. For instance, Iara 
(2006) found that young Eastern European man who moved and came back tend to claim in 
average 30% higher earnings than equivalent left-home workers. Hazans (2008) shows that 
Latvian return migrants command an earnings' premium as high as 15% compared to identical 
stayers.7 Such empirical evidence is consistent with both the self-selection cum bad luck model or 
the human capital accumulation model. 
This paper develops an original, complementary explanation that is consistent with these 
stylized facts. Migration is analyzed as a signal for hidden productivity along the lines of the 
classical model by Spence (1973). Our analysis is cast as a simple two-period game, with two 
types of workers -- highly productive and less productive, under imperfect information of the 
employers about the type of the worker. To neutralize one important cause of migration, we 
assume that worker's productivity is the same in the sending and the destination country. Firms 
pay the worker a wage identical to the expected productivity. Migration can have signaling 
virtues only if migratory costs are larger for bad workers than for good workers. In this paper, we 
build on a cost structure where all good workers migrate at the first period. At the second period, 
they can either return back home or and stay in the host country. Despite bearing higher 
migratory costs, bad workers can choose to migrate in order to be perceived as good workers and 
get a better wage. If they migrate, they can either return or stay. The game presents various 
equilibria depending on parameter values. In some cases, equilibria are multiple: which one 
actually materializes depends on firm equilibrium beliefs. The most interesting case is a complete 
hybrid equilibrium where both good and bad workers implement mixed strategies: some but not 
all good workers return, some but not all bad workers migrate and return. 
Besides the productivity differential, an important variable in our analysis is the migratory 
cost. Such a cost has a strong psychological component, related to the energy that the migrant 
needs to spend in order to adapt to a different environment. Other components such as traveling 
costs have a "transaction cost" nature, and can be easier converted into monetary expenses. 
Governments in the origin country can have an impact on such costs. They may for instance 
provide free language courses for prospective emigrants, subsidize transport (for instance, 
subsidize a discount journey every year), set up cultural centers in the destination country, 
provide good consular services, and so on. By choosing their country of destination, and the 
"distance" between home and destination, good workers can also have a bearing on migratory 
costs. In this context, the concept of distance is not only geographical, but also cultural. Notice 
that when migration is used as a signaling device, bad workers can only follow good workers, 
they have no word to say about choosing the destination. 
The logic of strategic signaling has already been applied to the one-way migration decision by 
Katz and Stark (1987). In their model, employers in the rich country know only the distribution 
of immigrants’ skills and pay them the average expected productivity. Imperfect information is 
responsible for inefficient migration patterns as compared to the perfect information setup. They 
show that the highly skilled workers may want to pay the price of signalling, should such a 
signalling device exist. 
Our analysis builds on several simplifying assumptions: at difference with Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996) and other companion papers, in our setup wages are deterministic (there is no 
                                                                                                                                                              
human capital accumulation is weak. 
7The test controls for demographic characteristics, education, foreign and unemployment 
experience of family members. 
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random shock to be discovered by the migrant once abroad). We also rule out the possibility of 
investing in human capital, which was an essential element in the paper by Dustmann and Weiss 
(2007). These simplifications will allow us to focus on the pure signaling virtues of migratory 
strategies. As in the permanent migration analysis of Katz and Stark (1987), a migrant's wage 
depends not only on his own characteristics, hard work and luck, but also on the various 
strategies of the other workers. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 presents 
the pure strategy equilibria of the game. Hybrid equilibria are analyzed in section 4. Policy issues 
are introduced in section 4. The last section presents the conclusion. 
 
2. The model 
2.1. Main assumptions 
 
There are two countries, the sending and the destination country. The internationally mobile 
labor force of the sending country is normalized to 1. A worker has the same productivity in the 
sending and the destination country. In the sending country there are     highly productive 
workers, with a productivity  g   (good type) and  1 −    workers with a low productivity  b   
(bad type) ,   with  g  b .   Worker productivity is a deterministic variable; it is the same in the 
sending and the host country. Firms make zero expected profits: they pay wages identical to the 
expected productivity of each worker. 
Migratory costs per period are  cg   for the type  g   and  cb   for the type  b,   with  cg  g   
and  cb  b . Furthermore, migration can be a useful signaling device only if  cg  cb .   We 
assume that this condition holds hereafter.8 
Workers live for two periods. At the first period, workers can migrate ( M  ) or not ( M̄); at the 
second period, those who migrated at the first period can return home ( R,   or stay in the host 
country ( S.   In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we restrict the range of 
parameters such as to rule out the cases where good workers have no incentive migrate even if 
this action allows them to signal their type. This implies that the migratory cost of the good 
workers is low enough, more precisely that  cg  21 − g − b .  9 
We define by  w1   (and  w2  ) the wage expected by a worker at the end of period 1 (and 
respectively period 2), depending on the history of the game (i.e., the observed decisions). 
We denote by     the proportion of good migrants who choose to return and by  1 −    the 
proportion of good migrants who choose to stay. 
Bad workers can either migrate or not; if they migrate they can either stay or return. The 
                                                 
8To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that migratory costs are time-invariant. In a 
more powerful model, migratory cost could change in time. However, the direction of change is 
not clear, some cost components should go down (migrants adapt to the new environment), some 
cost components rise (migrants miss their friends and family). 
9 The proof is straightforward if we compare the two-period payoff of a good worker that firstly 
migrates then comes back  2g − cg   with the payoff of a good worker who decides to fond into 
the mass of workers  2g  1 − b .   It can be shown that this condition also rules out a 
hybrid equilibrium where good workers are indifferent between migrating or not. 
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proportion of bad workers who leave and stay is  q,   the proportion of workers who leave and 
return is  p,   thus the proportion of bad workers who do not migrate is  1 − p − q.   
The basic sequence of decisions is summarized by a decision tree in Figure 1. 
Type g
θg
Type b
θb
α
1−α
Payoffs
M
M
M
_
M
_
Stay
Return
Stay
Return
w1(M)+w2(M,S) – 2cg
w1(M)+w2(M,R) - cg
w1(M)+w2(M,R) - cb
w1(M)+w2(M,S) - 2cb
w1(M)+w2(M,M)
_  _
1-π
π
p
q
1-p-q _
 
Figure 1. Decision tree 
 
At the beginning of the game, Nature decides on the type of worker,  b   or  g.   At time  
t  1,   good workers migrate, bad workers have the choice between migrating or not; at  t  2  
all migrants, bad or good, have the choice between returning home or staying in the host country. 
There are three main strategies:  M̄,M̄   - do not migrate,  M,S   -- migrate and stay and  
M,R   -- migrate and return. Only the first one reveals the type of worker. The two others can be 
implemented by both good and bad workers, hence the dotted lines that connects the similar 
strategies. 
 
2.2. Strategies, beliefs, payoffs 
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We define the strategy of the  g  -type worker by a linear combination of the two pure 
strategies:  M,R   and  M,S  . 
sg  play M,R with probability 
play M,S with probability 1 − 
 
 
The strategy of the  b  -type worker is a linear combination of the three pure strategies:  
M̄,M̄,    M,R   and  M,S  : 
 
sb 
play M,R with probability p
play M,S with probability q
play M̄,M̄ with probability 1 − p − q
 
Let us define by  s   the conditional probability that the worker is good given his past strategy  
s  . Under our assumptions, employers' beliefs are: 
a) After the first period: 
M  Prg |M  PrM|
gPrg
PrM 
PrM|gPrg
PrM|gPrg  PrM|bPrb 

  1 − p  q
M̄  Prg |M̄  0
 
b) After the second period: 
MR  Prg |M,R  PrM,R|
gPrg
PrM,R|gPrg  PrM,R|bPrb 

  1 − p
MS  Prg |M,S  PrM,S|
gPrg
PrM,S|gPrg  PrM,S|bPrb 
1 − 
1 −   1 − q
M̄M̄  Prg |M̄,M̄  0
 
Since firms pay wages identical to the worker's expected productivity, workers' equilibrium 
payoffs contingent upon their strategy are: 
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UbM̄,M̄  w1M̄  w2M̄  2b
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  
g  1 − p  qb
  1 − p  q − c
i  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  
g  1 − p  qb
  1 − p  q 
1 − g  1 − qb
1 −   1 − q − 2c
i
 
where  i ∈ g,b  . 
 
A Nash equilibrium of this game is defined as a situation where workers choose their optimal 
migratory strategy given employers' beliefs, and employers' beliefs are correct given workers' 
optimal migratory strategies. We can distinguish between three types of equilibria: a separating 
configuration -- where each type of worker chooses a specific migratory strategy, a pooling 
configuration -- where all workers carry out the same migratory strategy, and a hybrid 
configuration -- where at least one type of worker is randomizing between pure strategies. 
The list of all logically possible combinations of strategies can be drawn easily. Hereafter we 
will analyze only on the feasible equilibria.10 We firstly analyze the pure strategy equilibria of the 
game then turn to mixed strategy equilibria. 
 
3. Pure strategy equilibria 
 
Proposition 1. The game presents a socially efficient separating equilibrium where bad 
workers do not migrate  M̄,M̄   and good workers migrate and return  M,R  , under the 
sufficient and necessary condition: 
g − b   cb2 .  
 
 Proof See Appendix A 
 
If the migratory cost of bad workers is too high, they do not migrate and migration is a 
strategy specific to the good worker. The latter has no incentive to stay for good, since migration 
signals him as a good worker (and he can spare the migratory cost at the second period). 
In this equilibrium, firms in the origin country can use the migratory track record of an 
individual as an efficient screening device. Furthermore, because high productivity workers come 
back, overall output in the origin country edges up. 
 
 Proposition 2. The game presents a socially inefficient separating equilibrium where bad 
workers do not migrate  M̄,M̄   and good workers migrate and stay  M,S  , under the sufficient 
and necessary condition:  
cg  g − b  cb .  
 
                                                 
10The proof of inexistence of the other equilibria can be provided on request. 
 8
 Proof See Appendix A 
 
In this equilibrium, employers in the sending country do not expect good workers to come 
back. Equilibrium beliefs are such that the return strategy is associated to a bad worker. Hence, 
such an equilibrium can exist only if the migratory cost of good workers is not too high. To the 
opposite, the migratory cost  cb   of the bad workers must be large enough to prevent them from 
copying the strategy of the good workers. 
Compared to the former efficient separating equilibrium, at time  t  2  the economy-wide 
output is lower because all the highly productive workers have left for good. The only left home 
workers are the low productive ones. 
 
 Proposition 3. The game presents a pooling equilibrium where all workers migrate and stay, 
under the sufficient and necessary condition:  
cb  g − b .  
 
 Proof See Appendix A. 
 
Here, the migratory cost is so low that bad workers would leave too, in order to mimic the 
good ones. Furthermore, if a worker does not migrate, he will be perceived as a bad worker. The 
same rationale prompts them to stay abroad, since the decision to return is associated to a bad 
worker. The good workers are therefore "trapped" into an inefficient strategy. 
 
 Proposition 4. The game presents a pooling equilibrium where all workers migrate and 
return, under the sufficient and necessary condition:  
cb
2  
g − b   
 
 Proof See Appendix A. 
 
In this equilibrium the good worker will return, but will not benefit from the signalling effect. 
However, he has no other choice but to migrate, since if he stays he will be perceived as a bad 
one. Despite the high migratory cost,  b −  type workers also migrate in a first step, because the 
large frequency of good workers allow them to benefit of a high wage.11 
 
4. Hybrid equilibria 
 
Probably the most interesting situation is that where both types of workers play Nash mixed 
strategies. Indeed, in real life, patterns of migration seldom display pure strategies. Before 
analyzing these equilibria, we should state a proposition that allows to simplify the list of 
possible actions. 
                                                 
11Appendix A shows that this equilibrium can occur for  
cb
2  g − b    if firms beliefs are  
Prg|MS  0.  If  Prg|MS  1,   the equilibrium exists only for  c
b
2  g − b   c
g
1− .   
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 Proposition 5. If good workers are indifferent between returning or staying   ∈0,1  , all 
bad workers who have migrated at the first period prefer to return  q  0  . 
Proof. Starting from the indifference condition: 
UgM,R  UgM,S
w1M − cg  w2M,R  w1M  w2M,S − 2cg
w1M  w2M,R  w1M  w2M,S − cg
 
given that  cb  cg ,   we can write: 
w1M  w2M,R  w1M  w2M,S − cb
w1M  w2M,R − cb  w1M  w2M,S − 2cb  
The later inequality is equivalent to  UbM,R  UbM,S,   thus  q  0.  
 
We have thus established that   ∈0,1 q  0.   We can now analyze the equilibria. 
 
4.1. Full Hybrid Equilibrium. Some good workers return, the other 
stay. Some bad workers migrate and return, the other do not migrate. 
 
In this equilibrium,   ∈0,1  ,  p ∈0,1   and  q  0.  
 
 Proposition 6. The game presents an equilibrium where a fraction   ∈0,1   of good 
migrants decide to return, the other  1 −    good workers stay in the host country; a fraction  
p ∈0,1   of bad workers migrate and return, the other  1 − p   do not migrate, with:  
∗  
g − b − cg 
cg
2g − b − cg  cb
cg  cb − g − b
p∗  1 − 
2g − b − cg  cb
cg  cb − g − b
 
provided that: 
cg  cb
2  
g − b  min cg  12 c
b , c
g  cb
1  
 
 
Proof With   ∈0,1,    p ∈0,1,   (and  q  0,   workers' payoffs become: 
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UbM̄,M̄  w1M̄  w2M̄,M̄  2b
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p − c
i  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p  
g − 2ci
 
A first equilibrium condition: 
UgM,R  UgM,S
g  1 − pb
  1 − p − c
g  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p 
g  1 − pb
  1 − p  
g − 2cg
cg  1 − pg − b − cg  
 
allows to define the probability     as a function of  p   and various parameters: 
  1 − 
g − b − cg 
cg p  
 
Notice the necessary condition for existence:  
g − b − cg   0  cg  g − b .
 
The second equilibrium condition defines  p   according to parameters and    :  
UbM,R  UbM̄,M̄
g  1 − pb
  1 − p − c
b  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p  2
b
 
The equilibrium probability  p∗   can be determined if we substitute     by its former 
expression : 
 
g  1 − pb
  1 − p − c
b  
1−

g−b−cg
cg pg  1 − pb
 1− 
g−b−cg
cg p  1 − p
 2b
p∗  1 − 
2g − b − cg  cb
cg  cb − g − b
 
We then get : 
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∗  1 − 
g − b − cg 
cg p
∗  
g − b − cg 
cg
2g − b − cg  cb
cg  cb − g − b  
 
 
This equilibrium exists if both  p∗ ∈ 0,1   and  ∗ ∈ 0,1.   We check first the conditions 
for  p∗  0   and  ∗  0.   We must have either  2g − b − cg − cb  0   and  
cg  cb − g − b  0   or  2g − b − cg − cb  0   and  cg  cb − g − b  0.   
Only the former case is possible; it entails that: 
 
cg  cb
2  
g − b  cg  cb
 
with  p∗  0   and  ∗  0   for  g − b  c
gcb
2 .   
Then condition  ∗  1   requires that: 
g − b − cg 
cg
2g − b − cg  cb
cg  cb − g − b  1  
g − b  cg  12 c
b  
 
and condition  p∗  1   needs: 

1 − 
2g − b − cg  cb
cg  cb − g − b  1  
g − b  11   c
g  cb  
 
All these conditions can be written in a compact form : 
cg  cb
2  
g − b  min cg  12 c
b , c
g  cb
1    
 
 
We can easily see that  
cgcb
2  min cg  12 cb , c
gcb
1 , .  thus there are always some 
values of  g − b   such as this equilibrium can exist. We can also remark that the efficient 
separating equilibrium is not consistent with this hybrid equilibrium. Indeed, the separating 
equilibrium is possible if  2g − b   cb   which is in stark contradiction with  
cg  cb  2g − b  . 
In this equilibrium, the probability that the good worker comes back  ∗   is a decreasing 
function in both  cg   and  cg .   If policymakers aim at increasing the proportion of good workers 
that return, they should reduce migratory costs. This policy would also lead to an increase in the 
proportion of bad workers that migrate and return. 
 
 
4.2. Bad workers are indifferent between "not migrate" and "migrate-return". Good 
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workers migrate and return. 
 
Proposition 7. There is a partial Hybrid equilibrium 1 where all good workers migrate and 
return    1  , a fraction  p ∈0,1   of the bad workers migrate and return, no bad worker 
migrates and stays  q  0  , with 
p  1 − 
2g − b  − cb
cb
 
provided that: 
cb
2  
g − b   min cg  12 c
b , c
b
2 .
 
 
Proof Equilibrium conditions are:  UbM,R  UbM̄,M,    UbM,R  UbM,S   and  
UgM,R  UgM,S.   
Assume that good workers migrate and return so (   1  . Bad workers are indifferent 
between "not migrate" and "migrate-return". Thus, we can write : 
UbM,R  UbM̄,M̄
g  1 − pb
  1 − p − c
b  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p  2
b
p  1 − 
2g − b  − cb 
cb
 
 
Here  p   can be seen as an increasing function in g − b .   An equilibrium exists only if:  
0  p  1  12 c
b  g − b   12 c
b
 
Indeed,  2g − b  − cb  0  c
b
2  g − b    and  

1−
2 g−b −cb
cb
 1  g − b   cb2  . 
Given the structure of the full Hybrid equilibrium, should one migrant decide to stay, then 
employers believe that he is of the good type: 
MS  Prg |M,S  1  
 
Thus the payoff of a worker who stays in the host country is: 
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p  
g − 2ci, with i ∈ b,g.
 
Given these beliefs, the strategy  M,S   is dominated for the  b  -worker if : 
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UbM,R  UbM,S
g  1 − pb
  1 − p − c
b  
g  1 − pb
  1 − p 
g  1 − pb
  1 − p  
g − 2cb
p  1 − 
cb
g − b − cb  
 
We replace  p   by its equilibrium expression: 

1 − 
2g − b  − cb
cb
 1 − 
cb
g − b − cb  
g − b   32 c
b  
 
Consider now the  g  -workers. For them, this equilibrium implies that  M,R   is a dominant 
strategy given the previous beliefs : 
UgM,R  UgM,S
w1M − cg  w2M,R  w1M  w2M,S − 2cg
g  1 − pb
  1 − p  
g − cg
p  1 − 
cg
g − b − cg 
 
For the equilibrium  p  , this condition is tantamount to: 
2g − b  − cb
cb
 cgg − b − cg   
g − b   cg  12 c
b
 
Given that  c
g  12 cb  cb  12 cb  , the necessary condition for this equilibrium is:  
cb
2  
g − b   min cg  12 c
b , c
b
2 .  
 
Notice that the "efficient separating equilibrium", requiring  g − b   c
b
2 ,   is mutually 
exclusive with this equilibrium. 
 
4.3. Good workers are indifferent between "return or stay". Bad workers migrate 
and return. 
 
Proposition 8. There is a partial Hybrid equilibrium 2 where all bad workers migrate and 
return ( p  1  ), no bad worker migrants and stays  q  0   and a fraction     of the good 
workers migrate and return, and the other  1 −    good workers migrate and stay, with 
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  1 − 
g − b − cg 
cg
 
provided that: 
cg  cb
1    
g − b   cg1 − 
 
 
Proof Equilibrium conditions are:  UgM,R  UgM,S,    UbM,R  UbM,S   and  
UbM,R  UbM̄,M.   We have show in Proposition 5 that   ∈ 0,1  q  0,   that is  
UgM,R  UgM,S  UbM,R  UbM,S.   For   ∈ 0,1   and  p  1,   we have: 
UbM̄,M̄  w1M̄  w2M̄,M̄  2b
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  g  1 − b − ci  
g  1 − b
  1 − 
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  g  1 − b  g − 2ci
 
 
 
 
First condition: good workers play a mixed strategy if:  UgM,R  UgM,S.   With  p  1 , 
this implies: 
g − b 1 −   cg  1 − 
  1 − 
g − b − cg 
cg
 
We know that this equilibrium exists for  0    1  which is tantamount to: 
0  1 − 
g − b − cg 
cg  1.
 
This imposes additional constraints on parameters: 
g − b − cg  0  cg  g − b
1 − 

g − b − cg 
cg  1  
g − b   cg1 − 
 
In a compact form, the necessary conditions can be written:  
cg  g − b   cg1 −   
 
Second condition,  UbM,R  UbM̄,M̄,   is true for:  
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g  1 − b − cb  
1−

g−b−cg
cg g  1 − b
 1− 
g−b−cg
cg  1 − 
 2b
cg  cb
1    
g − b .
 
So, in a compact form, the necessary conditions for this equilibrium to exist are: 
max cg , c
g  cb
1    
g − b   cg1 − 
 
But because  cg  cb  , we have  cg  c
gcb
1 .   So the necessary and sufficient condition is: 
cg  cb
1    
g − b   cg1 − 
 
 
This equilibrium can exist only if if the proportion of good workers in the total population is 
large enough:  1 − cg  cb   cg1      c
b
2cgcb  . 
 
5. A synthesis and policy implications 
 
The analysis of temporary migration has been developed in the case where good workers have 
an incentive to migrate, more precisely if their migratory cost is relatively low:  
cg  21 − g − b   g − b   cg
21 −  .
 
In this context, we have shown that the game presents several equilibria, that are summarized 
in the Table 1. 
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EQ.  ∗    p∗    q∗  Necessary and sufficient conditions 
Sep. 
"efficient" 
1 0 0  g − b   c
b
2   
Sep. 
"inefficient" 
0 0 0  cg  g − b  cb   
Pooling MS 0 0 1  
cb
  g − b    
Pooling MR 1 1 0  
cb
2  g − b    
Hybrid Full  
0  ∗  1   
 
0  ∗  1  
0  
cgcb
2  g − b  min cg  12 cb , c
gcb
1
  
Hybrid 1 1  
0  ∗  1  
0  
cb
2  g − b   min cg  12 cb , c
b
2   
Hybrid 2  
0  ∗  1   
1 0 
 
cgcb
1  g − b   c
g
1− ,   if    c
b
2cgcb   
 
Table 1. A summary of the equilibria 
 
 
The most complex configuration of this game appears for    c
b
2cgcb .   In the opposite case, 
the Hybrid 2 equilibrium does not exist. In the following, we will develop more in detail the 
complex picture. 
We can notice that    c
b
2cgcb     cg  12 cb  c
gcb
1   and  c
g  12 cb  c
b
2 .   So, 
for    c
b
2cgcb ,    min c
g  12 cb , c
gcb
1  c
gcb
1   and  
min cg  12 cb , c
b
2  c
b
2 .   We also have for    c
b
2cgcb     c
gcb
1  c
b
2 .   
The efficient separating equilibrium exists if  g − b   c
b
2 .   Yet the model has been 
developed for the case where good workers do migrate, i.e.  g − b  
cg
21− .   So the efficient 
separating case can be feasible only if:  
cg
21 −   
g − b   cb2 .  
 
There is a non empty set for  g − b    only if:  
cg
1 −   c
b  cg  cb1 −     cb − cg
cb
 
On the other hand, we argued that the full configuration of equilibria requires    c
b
2cgcb .   
Hence, the most general picture obtains only for: 
 17
cb
2cg  cb   
cb − cg
cb
 
 
There is a non empty interval for     if:  
cb
2cg  cb 
cb − cg
cb
 cg  cb /2
 
Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the regionning of equilibria in this case. To bring 
some intuition about the thresholds, we choose  cb  2  ,  cg  0.5   and    0.7   ( 
0.66  212    2−0.52  0.75.  
 
α+
+
1
gb cc
2
gb cc +
1
α−1
gc
2
bcgc bc α
bc
α2
bc
Sep. efficient
Separating inefficient
Pooling (M,R)
Pooling (M,S)
Full Hybrid
Hybrid 1 Hybrid 2
0 )( bg θθ −
20.5 1.431.25 1.47 2.851.660.83
)1(2 α−
gc
 
 
Figure 2. Regionning of the equilibria 
 
Some policy implications can be inferred from this simple model. We can notice that, 
depending on parameters, the game can present multiple equilibria. For instance, for  
cb
2  g − b   c
bcg
1 ,   either the Pooling MR or the Inefficient Separating equilibrium or the 
Full Hybrid equilibrium can occur. Which one actually materializes depends on firms' 
equilibrium beliefs. In turn, if the economic model is prone for multiple equilibria, it is very 
difficult for policymakers to work out effective policies, since they cannot infer what is the type 
of the prevailing equilibrium. 
From the origin country policymakers' point of view, the most desired equilibrium is the 
"efficient separating one". For a given productivity differential, they might be tempted to reach it 
by rising migratory costs of the bad workers. This policy might not always be efficient. For 
instance, in this configuration of the game the efficient separating equilibrium always comes with 
the inefficient separating one. Unfortunately policymakers have no method to impose their 
preferred situation. Policymakers may also try to manipulate the productivity differential, by 
improving training programs, such as to narrow the gap between good and bad workers along the 
hidden but valuable characteristics. 
The full hybrid equilibrium is an interesting situation, insofar as both good and bad workers 
play mixed strategies. Contrary to what intuition would suggest, if this equilibrium prevails, more 
good workers will return if migratory costs are small. Indeed, if migratory costs are low, more 
bad workers will migrate, and the wage of the good workers will decline. Hence, they will have a 
stronger incentive to come back and avoid the migratory cost. 
In all the hybrid equilibria good workers are penalized as compared to separating equilibria 
because, due to bad migrants, their wage is lower. They may try to signal themselves by choosing 
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such a migratory destination that the migratory cost  cg   (and implicitly  cb  , because by 
assumption  cb  cg   becomes so high that the bad workers have no incentive to follow them (in 
other words, they might push costs so high that only the separating equilibria does prevail).12 If 
this logic holds, one can expect to see migration flowing toward "hard" places, even if such a 
tough experience has no impact on the migrant's productivity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Temporary migration called the attention of policymakers and economists in the recent period. 
In particular, temporary migration seems to be the dominant contemporary pattern of migration 
between Eastern and Western European regions. In general, in developed countries temporary 
migrants benefit of a more favorable public opinion than permanent migrants, since they are seen 
as filling a well identified labor shortage (mainly in the hospitality sector, cleaning, agriculture, 
food processing, etc.). From the developing country perspective, whatever workers' 
qualifications, temporary migration is often seen as a source of additional income, since 
temporary migrants use to reinvest most of their earnings in the origin country. Furthermore, 
there is a strong belief that working abroad might help improving a worker's human capital. 
Many factors drive an individual's decision to migrate then return. Existing literature has 
emphasized two of them: investment in human capital -- individuals work abroad for some time 
in order to learn and improve their skills then come back home, and errors -- workers go abroad 
hoping to get a better wage; some of them have bad luck, get low wages, thus they prefer to come 
back. In this paper we put forward another possible motive, which can be matched with both the 
former explanations. In our model, good workers always migrate at the first period. They do it 
because their migratory cost is rather low and because by migrating they can get a better wage 
than they could get at home. At the second period, some of them return, the other don't. Whether 
good workers return or not depends on the strategy of the bad workers. If bad workers do not 
migrate, the mere decision to migrate signals a worker as being of the high-productivity type and 
allows him to claim a high wage. If at least some bad workers mimic the behavior of the good 
workers and migrate as well, migration becomes a less efficient signaling strategy. Rational 
employers would adjust wages accordingly, thus penalizing good workers as compared to the 
perfect information setup. Notice that the signaling effect of migration can be obtained 
independently of any improvement in migrants' human capital. 
From the point of view of the sending country, the most appealing configuration corresponds 
to the separating equilibrium with return migration. In this configuration, migration is a useful 
signaling device: firms can use the migratory track record to screen individuals. Stayers and 
migrants are paid to their true productivity; furthermore, the latter come back and contribute to 
output growth. Unfortunately, this equilibrium might not be single. One important contribution of 
this paper is to emphasize the scope for multiple equilibria. In turn, this makes efficient return 
policies hard to design, since policymakers have no reliable means to detect the type of the 
prevailing equilibrium. Policy recommendations differ depending on the equilibrium. In general, 
migratory costs must be raised in order to obtain a separating equilibrium. Yet, if the full hybrid 
equilibrium is at work, a developing country that aims at bringing back its best people must 
                                                 
 
12Of course, it should be checked that this strategy is rational, i.e., that good workers' payoff is 
larger with such a high cost than in the hybrid case. 
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reduce migratory costs. 
If migrants can control migratory costs, for instance by choosing their destination, good 
migrants might implement a policy of over-signaling: they can choose such a remote location that 
bad workers cannot follow. In this case, the separating equilibrium prevails, at the expense of 
good migrants who bear abnormal migratory costs. This is the price that good workers must pay 
in order to remove the informational asymmetry. In this context, any policy that helps 
suppressing imperfect information would be welfare improving. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of existence of the pure strategy 
equilibria 
 
A 1. Separating equilibria 
A 1.1. Bad workers do not migrate  M̄,M̄.  Good workers migrate and stay abroad  M,S  
. 
Equilibrium probabilities are    0  and  q  p  0.   Equilibrium conditions are:  
UbM̄,M̄  UbM,S,    UbM̄,M̄  UbM,R,    UgM,R  UgM,S.   
In this equilibrium, the payoffs become: 
UbM̄,M̄  w1M̄  w2M̄  2b
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  2g − 2ci
 
 UiM,R   depends on beleifs. There can be investigated two situations: 
Case 1 : MR  Prg |M,R  1.  We can check that 
UgM,R  UgM,S  2g − cg  2g − 2cg   is impossible. 
Case 2 :  MR  Prg |M,R  0.   
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  g − ci  b
 
UbM̄,M̄  UbM,S  2b  2g − 2cb  cb  g − b
 
UbM̄,M̄  UbM,R  2b  g − cb  b  cb  g − b
 
UgM,R  UgM,S  g − cg  b  2g − 2cg  cg  g − b
 
Sufficient and necessary condition: 
cg  g − b  cb
 
 
A.1. 2. Bad workers do not migrate  M̄,M̄.   Good workers migrate and return  M,R  . 
In this case    1,   and  q  p  0.   
The payoffs are: 
UbM̄,M̄  w1M̄  w2M̄  2b
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  2g − ci
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  g − 2ci  b
 
Equilibrium conditions:  UbM̄,M̄  UbM,S,    UbM̄,M̄  UbM,R,    
UgM,R  UgM,S  . 
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Case 1. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs:  MS  Prg |M,S  0    
UgM,R  UgM,S
2g − cg  g − 2cg  b
g − b  −cg  
 
is true. 
The two other conditions are 
UbM̄,M̄  UbM,S  2b  g − 2cb  b  cb  12 
g − b 
 
UbM̄,M̄  UbM,R  2b  2g − cb  cb  2g − b 
 
Notice that the latter encompasses the former. 
Case 2 : Out-of-equilibrium beliefs:  MS  Prg |M,S  1  . 
UbM̄,M̄  w1M̄  w2M̄  2b
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  2g − ci
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  2g − 2ci
 
Condition  UgM,R  UgM,S  2g − cg  2g − 2cg   is true. The other two conditions 
are 
UbM̄,M̄  UbM,S  2b  2g − 2cb  cb  g − b
 
UbM̄,M̄  UbM,R  2b  2g − cb  cb  2g − b 
 
The latter encompasses the former. 
Hence, the sufficient and necessary condition is: 
g − b   cb /2.
 
 
A.2. Pooling equilibria 
A. 2.1All workers migrate and stay  M,S   
In this equilibrium,    0,    q  1   and  p  0   
Equilibrium conditions: UbM,S  UbM,R,    UbM,S  UbM̄,M̄,    
UgM,S  UgM,R.   
The payoffs: 
UbM̄,M̄  w1M̄  w2M̄  2b
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  2g  1 − b  − 2ci
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Case 1 : beliefs :  MR  Prg |M,R  1.   
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  g  1 − b − ci  g
 
Equilibrium conditions: 
UbM,S  UbM,R
2g  1 − b  − 2cb  g  1 − b − cb  g
g  1 − b  − cb  g
 
Impossible. 
Case 2 : beliefs :  MR  Prg |M,R  0.   Thus: 
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  g  1 − b − ci  b
 
Equilibrium conditions: 
UbM,S  UbM,R  2g  1 − b  − 2cb  g  1 − b − cb  b  g − b   cb
 
UbM,S  UbM̄,M̄  2g  1 − b  − 2cb  2b  g − b   cb  
 
UgM,S  UgM,R2g  1 − b  − 2cg  g  1 − b − cg  b  g − b   cg
 
Necessary and sufficient condition: 
cb  g − b .  
 
A. 2.2.All workers migrate and return  M,R   
Equilibrium probabilities    1  and  p  1.   
Equilibrium conditions: UbM,R  UbM,S,    UbM,R  UbM̄,M̄,    
UgM,R  UgM,S.   
Payoffs: 
UbM̄,M̄  w1M̄  w2M̄  2b
UiM,R  w1M − ci  w2M,R  2g  1 − b  − ci
 
Case 1. Let us consider that the firm beliefs are such as  MS  Prg |M,S  0.   It follows 
that: 
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  g  1 − b  b − 2ci
 
Equilibrium conditions are: 
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UbM,R  UbM̄,M̄  g − b   cb2
 
UbM,R  UbM,S  g − b  −cb
 
which is always true and 
UgM,R  UgM,S  g − b  −cb
 
Which is true as well. So this equilibrium exists for these beliefs for  g − b   c
b
2 .   
Case 2. Let us consider now the alternative beliefs:  MS  Prg |M,S  1.   In this case, 
the payoff connected to the strategy  MS   is: 
UiM,S  w1M  w2M,S − 2ci  g  1 − b  g − 2ci
 
Equilibrium conditions are: 
UbM,R  UbM,S  cb1 −   
g − b 
 
UbM,R  UbM̄,M̄  g − b   cb2
 
The two conditions are jointly fulfilled if: 
cb
2  
g − b   cb1 −   
 
The third condition is: 
UgM,R  UgM,S  2g  1 − b  − cg  g  1 − b  g − 2cg  g − b   cg1 − 
 
But  cg  cb .   So the two former conditions entail the sufficient and necessary condition: 
cb
2  
g − b   cg1 −   
 
In the text, we refer to the broader domain of existence of this equilibrium, more precisely  
g − b   cb2 ,   which builds on the former set of beliefs. 
